This contribution discusses Leibniz's conception of faith and its relation to reason. It shows that, for Leibniz, faith embraces both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions: although it must be grounded in reason, it is not merely reasonable belief. Moreover, for Leibniz, a truth of faith (like any truth) can never be contrary to reason but can be above the limits of comprehension of human reason. The latter is the epistemic status of the Christian mysteries.
religious experience of others but also our own religious experiences, Leibniz is read as granting "immunity" "from further justificatory requirements" to first-person religious experiences. 9 These direct religious experiences would ground, for Leibniz, first-person religious beliefs which can be held in an epistemically justified manner without any further evidence or rational evaluation.
In contrast to these two opposite interpretations, this chapter will argue that Leibniz is neither a proto-Deist who subordinates revelation to reason, nor a Reformed Epistemologist ante-litteram who borders on fideism. Instead, Leibniz develops a 'middle way' between a theological rationalism which denies any genuine epistemic space to truths above reason and a fideism which denies the need for religious belief to be rationally justified. 10 This 'middle way' is deeply indebted to the scholastic tradition of philosophical theology --both the classic medieval tradition and the Protestant Scholastics of Leibniz's own time. While remarkably close to the Thomist conception of the epistemic space proper to faith, it is at the same time firmly anchored in Leibniz's Protestant background. Notably, it significantly diverges from the intellectualistic conception of theology characteristic of the Thomist tradition by regarding theology as ultimately practical.
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What is faith?
Before embarking in a discussion of the relationship between faith and reason, it is helpful to consider what Leibniz means by 'faith' and by 'reason'. Leibniz's conception of faith is richer than one might expect. It embraces both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions, involving intellectual apprehension and rational appetite, intellect, and will. 
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As it is generally the case with the intellect (the first of the two main faculties of our mental life), the cognitive or intellective element of faith has truth as its object. This is, however, a specific kind of truth: not the truth which the human intellect can reach in a natural way, without the help of the supernatural light of faith, but "the truth which God has revealed in an extraordinary way." 13 The proper objects of faith are therefore truths "above reason", that is, revealed truths which surpass the ability of the human intellect to discover and fully comprehend.
14 In turn, considering not the object or content of faith but the ground or reason for assenting to this content, faith "can be compared to experience". Faith, "as regards the motives which verify it," depends "on the experience of those who have seen the miracles, on which revelation is founded, and on the Tradition worthy of credibility, which has transmitted them to us, both through the Scriptures, and through the report of those who have preserved them." This is similar, Leibniz continues, to any belief based on testimony. For instance, we ground our beliefs about China "on the experience of those who have seen China, and on the credibility of their report, when we give credence [ajoutons foy] to the wonders which are narrated to us of that distant country". 15 This second aspect of faith captures faith as trustmore specifically, faith as trust in testimony that mediates divine testimony (or divine revelation) itself.
There is, however, a third component of faith which concerns the appetitive aspect of the human soul. As is generally the case with the volitional element of human life, its object is the good. The third aspect of faith is constituted by a longing for the good, which is desired and loved as our fulfilment and happiness. This striving for the good is informed or motivated by charity (the highest kind of love) rather than by rational motives, and is the fruit of the "internal movement of the Holy Spirit who takes possession of souls, and persuades them and brings them to the good, that is to say, to faith and charity, without always having need of motives."
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Although faith, for Leibniz, must be grounded in reason, in its full sense it is not reduced to reasonable belief but also requires a supernatural infusion of grace.
13 Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 1 (GP VI 49).
14 See for instance Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 23 (GP VI 64).
15 Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 1 (GP VI 49-50). See the section on "Motives of Credibility" for a more detailed discussion of this passage. In sum, Leibniz's conception seems to capture the three traditional aspects of the act of faith, expressed by the Thomist formula credere Deum (to believe 'that God', or to believe some content about God); credere Deo (to believe God, that is, trust revelation); credere in Deum (to believe in God as fulling one's life, leading to happiness, and so on). 17 Moreover, Leibniz stresses another traditional component of orthodox accounts of faith, namely, the role of divine grace. This is a role acknowledged by all main Christian confessions but especially emphasized by Protestants, who perceived the Roman Catholic Church as inclining instead toward Pelagianism. More specifically, Leibniz distinguishes between "human faith" and "divine faith": "human faith" is grounded in "explicable" reasons or rational "motives of credibility"; "divine faith", or faith in the full sense of the term, is grounded in "inexplicable reasons", that is, in a direct religious experience which comes from grace. In other words, the ability to produce rational arguments in support of the Christian religion is not needed for salvation. This fact, however, does not eliminate the need for reasons of credibility which can be presented to those who ask for them. Answering the objection that the "internal declaration of God is sufficient without rational arguments, for many people believe in accordance with the simplicity of their own heart, even if they know no rational reasons for believing," Leibniz writes:
I agree that many people, with the singular benevolence of God adapting itself to the capacity of all, possess a true faith without having any convincing reasons for it, and that these people can be saved. But our religion would be wretched if it lacked persuasive arguments, and it would not be preferable to that of the Mohammedans or the pagans since no reason could be given to those who asked for one, nor could the faith be defended against impiety or even against the doubts which often make pious men anxious.
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established that what is contained in it, and is shown to us, is God's will and not the illusion of an evil demon, or our sinister interpretation. And indeed, if any revelation is destitute of such marks, there is no obligation to submit to it". 
8
Thus to the objection that "we can be saved without logic", Leibniz replies decisively: "I agree, for we can also be saved without reasoning … Yet we are unable to grasp and uphold the foundations of faith without reasoning". 23 In fact, according to Leibniz's psychology of belief, any belief must be based on some reasons, although these reasons may well fall short of water-tight formal arguments: "it is obvious that nothing can be believed if one does not think that one has some proof or ground for it. Therefore it must be acknowledged that we all have need of some examination, otherwise religion would be arbitrary." "In order to believe, faith must be presented in a credible way: otherwise there is no obligation to believe." 24 Moreover, rational motives of credibility which support faith are important due to the very fact that they are "explicable," that is, they can be communicated and shared with others.
They constitute "public", as opposed to "private", marks of truth which are needed in religion as in philosophy.
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On the other hand, these rational arguments do not provide the full foundation on which the Christian faith rests. 26 Rather, they constitute the preliminary checks on the trustworthiness of a witness or a messenger, whose testimony defies appearances and common experience:
the motives of credibility justify, once and for all, the authority of the Holy Scripture before the Tribunal of Reason, so that afterwards Reason surrenders to it, as to a new light, and sacrifices to it all its likelihoods. It is a bit like a new president sent by the Prince, who must show his Letters Patent in the Assembly where he will later have to preside.
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Moreover, rational arguments are not sufficient to convince on their own. For the "full conviction" of true faith (that is, "divine" as opposed to merely "human" faith) the divine illumination of grace is needed. "Contrary to the Pelagians," Leibniz writes in the Nouveaux Christianae, A VI iv 2362).
Most importantly, faith is not merely a cognitive state involving belief and the intellect.
True faith involves also the will and our affective states ("the heart"):
Divine Faith itself, when it is kindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion, and does not depend upon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; it goes beyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of the heart, to make us act with warmth and pleasure, as the law of God commands, without further need to think of reasons, or stop at argumentative difficulties that the mind may envisage.
29
What is reason?
Reason, in turn, is defined by Leibniz (at least in this context) as the "concatenation of truths, but especially (when it is compared with faith) of those truths that the human mind can attain naturally without being helped by the lights of faith." 30 Defined in this way, Leibniz continues, reason cannot be faulted, contrary to those who argue (like Pierre Bayle) that human reason is a fallible instrument which often deceives us and which, therefore, cannot be trusted. To be sure, understood as the faculty of reasoning correctly, reason is not infallible.
There are indeed plenty of cases in which we are deceived by the false appearance of sound reasoning as much as we are deceived by the appearances of the senses. 31 The point is,
however, that when the reasoning is sound, that is, when there is a sound "concatenation of 28 Leibniz is referring to the Evangelical (or Lutheran), the Reformed (or Calvinist), and the Roman Catholic confessions.
29 Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 29; GP VI 67-68.
30 Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 1 (GP VI 49).
31 Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 65 (GP VI 87): "If by Reason we mean in general the faculty to reason well or badly, I grant that this faculty could deceive us, and in fact it deceives us, and that the appearances of our understanding are often as deceptive as those of the senses."
truths and objections in due form," 32 "it is impossible for reason to deceive us" (GP VI 87).
In this sense of a concatenations of truths, human reason is as certain as God's reason.
According to Leibniz, it is therefore mistaken to maintain, like Bayle, that revealed doctrines are conform to the "supreme and universal reason which is in the divine intellect, or to reason in general" but are not conform "to the portion of reason of which humankind makes use to judge of things."
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This portion of reason which we possess is a gift of God, and consists in the natural light which has remained in us in the midst of corruption. This portion is conform to the whole, and differs from the reason which is in God only as a drop of water differs from the Ocean, or rather as the finite differs from the infinite. Therefore mysteries may surpass it, but they cannot be contrary to it. Something could not be contrary to a part without being contrary to the whole. Moreover, 'comprehension' is for Leibniz a technical term to be read against the backdrop of his account of the degrees of knowledge. 37 Our knowledge has increasing degrees of perfection depending on the extent to which we are able to know the properties or . This is what is called presumption, which is incomparably more than a simple supposition, since the majority of suppositions should not be admitted unless they are proved: but all that has presumption on its side must be taken as true until it is refuted. … possibility is always presumed and must be held as true until impossibility is proved. Thus this argument has the power to shift the onus probandi in adversarium, or of charging the opponent with the burden of proof.
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The thought that presumption is stronger than supposition or conjecture is echoed both in the Nouveaux Essais and in the Theodicy, where Leibniz clarifies that "to presume" is not to accept without proof but to accept provisionally until a proof to the contrary is forthcoming: 
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As for 'presumption', which is a jurists' term, good usage by them distinguishes it from 'conjecture'. It is something more than that, and which should be accepted provisionally as true until there is a proof to the contrary [...] In this sense, therefore, to presume is not to accept before the proof, which is not at all permitted, but to accept in advance but not without foundation, while waiting for a proof to the contrary.
Amongst lawyers that is called 'presumption' which must provisionally pass for truth in case the contrary is not proved; and it says more than 'conjecture'. 44 In the case of the mysteries, a believer is epistemically justified "to accept in advance but not without foundation" (that is, for Leibniz, on the basis of motives of credibility) their possibility until the contrary is proved. Thus, "to presume is … to hold something as certain until the opposite is proved." (A VI ii 567)
Moreover, Leibniz stresses that improbability must be sharply distinguished from impossibility. Mysteries are improbable according to reason. 45 "At first glance," they may even seem impossible. 46 It is granted from the very beginning that, precisely in so far as they are 'mysteries', they are against appearances and contrary to the verisimilitudes of reason. It is enough, however, that they are not absurd, and any alleged absurdity requires a positive demonstration of contradictoriness. 47 From their contrariety to experience follows in fact only improbability, not impossibility:
Merely the improbability of a thing is proved by induction from other examples, as when the Socinians say that in all of nature there is to be found no Being that is one in number which has three Subsistences; from this impossibility is not inferred, only In sum, the problem of how human reason can check the contradictoriness or noncontradictoriness of a doctrine above its comprehension is solved by shifting from a positive argument to a negative argument, that is, from a proof of the possibility of the mysteries to a proof that their impossibility has not been proved. If a doctrine is a genuine divine revelation, it will always be possible to defend it against the charge of contradiction, since no true revelation could be against reason.
48
The next step of the 'strategy of defense' proposed by Leibniz is therefore to respond to objections against the mysteries. Leibniz is very clear that the burden of proof is on those who attack the mysteries, not on those who defend them. 49 It is up to the attacker to prove that a doctrine presumed true on the basis of a long ecclesiastical tradition is in fact false because it implies contradiction. The defender can limit herself to showing that the arguments presented by the objector are not conclusive (e.g. it is sufficient "to deny the universality of some proposition of the objection, or to criticize its form"), 50 without this involving any positive argument in favor of the thesis which is attacked. Those who uphold the mysteries, grant in fact from the outset that, being above human reason, their truth cannot be demonstrated. 51 On the other hand, human
reason can attain what is superior to it not by "penetrating it" but by supporting its possibility, "as we can attain the sky by sight, and not by touch".
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Motives of credibility
Presumption, however, does not discriminate on its own between competing and opposed religious doctrines which could also claim for themselves a presumption of possibility. In order to establish the greater credibility of its doctrines over competing religions, a religion must support such a claim in some other way. This is the role of the "motives of credibility", 48 See for instance Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § § 22 -25. The Latin translation of the Theodicy (revised by Leibniz) adds to § 58 of the "Preliminary Discourse" a reference to ST I q. I, a. 8, where Thomas Aquinas writes: "since faith is based on infallible truth, and it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary of truth, it is evident that arguments brought against faith are not demonstrations but arguments that can be answered". 49 Cf. for instance Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 58 (GP VI 82); § 73 (GP VI 93); § 77 (GP VI 95-96); §
(GP VI 96).
50 Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 72 (GP VI 92).
51 Cf. for instance Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 75 (GP VI 94).
52 Theodicy, "Preliminary Discourse", § 72 (GP VI 91).
that is, the motives or reasons which can be produced to uphold the credibility of a putative divine revelation.
As we have already seen, the condition sine qua non of the credibility of any doctrine is, first of all, the lack of any proven contradiction. Polytheism, for instance, would not have for Leibniz any credibility since its falsity follows from the uniqueness of God, for which
Leibniz argues, in turn, on the basis of the principle of identity of indiscernibles. 53 Secondly, in order for any religious doctrine to be credible, we must be able to grasp to some extent the meaning of the words which express this doctrine. "Faith," Leibniz writes, "is believing.
Believing is holding something to be true. Truth is not of words but of things; for whoever Crucially, however, a confused degree of understanding is sufficient. Most of our cognition is indeed of this kind. It would be unreasonable to expect higher epistemic standards for the supernatural realm than those routinely accepted in our cognition of the natural world or in our grasp of many theoretical matters:
it is not always necessary for faith to know what sense of the words is true as long as we understand it, nor do we positively reject it, but rather leave it in doubt even though we might be inclined towards some other [sense] . Indeed, it suffices that we believe in the first place that whatever is contained in the meanings, is true, and this first and foremost in the mysteries in which the practice does not change, whatever the meaning may finally be. Leibniz is keen to stress that this kind of "blind thinking [cogitationem caecam]" is sufficient to guide reasonable action. We rely on it in all sort of contexts, including in theoretical discussions in which (for instance) philosophers speak confidently of "matter", "form", and "cause". 57 His conclusion is that, a fortiori, in matters concerning the supernatural realm, such confused cognition ought to be sufficient for the most important of all practical purposes, namely, salvation:
To anyone who maintains that a distinct cognition of the meaning of the mysteries of faith is necessary to Salvation, it will be demonstrated by me that hardly the thousandth of Christians ... ever have had it. And as a consequence, it suffices for Salvation to hold onto the formula expressed in the Holy Scripture, with a confused cognition of the meaning by the intellect, and with a kind of disjunctive assent or belief. (A VI i 552)
Equally importantly, "as regards the motives which verify it," the Christian faith depends "on the experience of those who have seen the miracles, on which revelation is founded, and on the Tradition worthy of credibility, which has transmitted them to us" (GP VI 49-50). Before any assessment of the content of Scripture, Leibniz is well aware of the need to verify the authenticity and antiquity of the texts, using the philological and historical tools which would be employed for any other historical work. It is through these texts that the testimony about a putative divine revelation has reached us. As in any other case, their trustworthiness needs to 
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For it is impossible to anyone aside from God to see the general chain of causes which have to come together in the production of contingent things. 66 Notwithstanding this (parsimonious) endorsement of miracles, it is still necessary to ask in which sense there could be a miracle in the Leibnizian universe, given Leibniz's completeconcept theory and his conception of pre-established harmony. 67 Leibniz defines a miracle, strictly speaking, as something which "could not be explained by the natures of created things". 68 The exceptionality or rarity of an event is not in itself proof of its being miraculous, as the generality of some kind of event is not in itself a proof of its being natural. 69 Further, a miracle is not some event which does not follow order, or does not follow any law. 70 Rather, a miracle is an event which does not follow a natural law, that is, one of the contingent laws of nature which God has chosen but which admit exceptions due to some reason which conforms to a superior order. Thus, miracles "are always in conformity with the universal law of the general order, although they are above subordinate maxims," or laws of nature. 71 It is in this sense that a miracle "could not be explained by the natures of created things," that is, through natural laws which normally regulate created things and which provide the framework of what is 'natural' to them. The 'nature' of a created thing, intended instead as its individual essence, cannot but contain in itself also the explanation of any miracle which may affect that substance, that is, the explanation of any fact which does not follow a subordinate law of nature. This fact will still follow "the universal law of the general order" and will still be eternally included with its sufficient reason in the complete concept of that individual substance. Moreover, it will be mirrored in the essences of all the individuals which constitute the same possible world. Thus Leibniz writes that "the primitive laws essential to the series, true without exception," "contain the whole purpose of God in choosing the universe," including "miracles." 72 In the Theodicy, he concludes:
It will also be said that, if everything is governed by rules, God could not make miracles. But one should know that the miracles which happen in the world were also included and represented as possible in this same world, considered at the stage of pure possibility; and God, who has since performed them, had decided to perform them when he has chosen this world. (GP VI 132)
By making space for miracles, Leibniz is able to include them among the "motives of credibility" that the Christian revelation must have to be distinguished from "those believing without foundation that their [spiritual] movements come from God." The Mysteries can be explained as much as is needed in order to believe them; but one cannot comprehend them, nor show how they arise; even in physics we explain several sensible qualities up to a certain point, but in an imperfect manner, for we do not comprehend them. Nor is it possible for us, either, to prove the Mysteries by reason: for everything that can be proved a priori, or by pure reason, can be comprehended. All that remains for us to do, therefore, after having given faith to the Mysteries on the basis of the proofs of the truth of Religion (what one calls the motives of credibility), is to be able to support them against objections; without which we would have no grounds for believing them". (GP VI 52)
For Leibniz, faith must be grounded in reason not in the sense that it should be subjected to reason but in the sense that it cannot be irrational. Faith, however, is not merely a matter of believing true doctrines. For the purpose of salvation, the greatest sign of true faith remains for him "the love of God above all things."
